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The development and maintenance of prosocial, other-oriented behaviors has been of
considerable recent interest. Though it is clear that prosocial behaviors emerge early and
play a uniquely important role in the social lives of humans, there is less consensus
regarding the mechanisms that underlie and maintain these fundamental acts. The goal
of this paper is to clarify inconsistencies in our understanding of the early emergence
and development of prosocial behavior by proposing a taxonomy of prosocial behavior
anchored in the social-cognitive constraints that underlie the ability to act on behalf of
others. I will argue that within the general domain of prosocial behavior, other-oriented
actions can be categorized into three distinct types (helping, sharing, and comforting) that
reﬂect responses to three distinct negative states (instrumental need, unmet material
desire, and emotional distress). In support of this proposal, I will demonstrate that the
three varieties of prosocial behavior show unique ages of onset, uncorrelated patterns of
production, and distinct patterns of individual differences. Importantly, by differentiating
speciﬁc varieties of prosocial behavior within the general category, we can begin to explain
inconsistencies in the past literature and provide a framework for directing future research
into the ontogenetic origins of these essential social behaviors.
Keywords: prosocial behavior, social-cognitive development, emotional development
Humans have a number of exceptional abilities, one of which is
our pervasive, obligatory sociality (Brewer and Caporael, 2006).
Not only do humans regularly act with others, we also often
act on behalf of others (e.g., Tomasello, 2009). Importantly,
this other-oriented tendency has long been recognized as an
intriguing explanatory puzzle. Speciﬁcally, from a strict Dar-
winian “survival of the ﬁttest” perspective, behaviors that beneﬁt
another at a cost to one’s self should not exist, largely because
the temptation to, and beneﬁts of, cheating are simply too high
(e.g., Darwin, 1859; Dawkins, 1989). Yet, despite the explana-
tory challenges, other-oriented acts do exist and appear to be
an essential (Tomasello, 2009), automatic (Zaki and Mitchell,
2013), universal (e.g., Henrich et al., 2005; Callaghan et al.,
2011), and relatively unique (e.g., Warneken and Tomasello, 2009;
Silk and House, 2011) part of human social life.
The ability and willingness to engage in prosocial behavior
appears to have important implications for well-being at the indi-
vidual (e.g., Crick, 1996; Sallquist et al., 2012), group (Anderson
and Kilduff, 2009), and societal (Zak, 2008; Tomasello, 2009;
Pinker, 2011) level of analysis. Due in part to their intriguing the-
oretical constraints (Hamilton, 1964; Trivers, 1971), and in part
to their widespread social implications (Tomasello, 2009; Pinker,
2011), other-oriented behaviors have captured the curiosity of
scholars froma variety of disciplines (e.g., Bowles andGintis, 2011;
Wilson, 2012; Bloom, 2013; Greene, 2013). This diverse interest
has resulted in a large body of literature examining the factors
that support the emergence and maintenance of these essential
social acts across both phylogeny (Warneken and Melis, 2012)
and ontogeny (Eisenberg et al., in press). Yet, instead of providing
clarity and insight, these diverse research programs have brought
to light a number of challenges and controversies in our current
understanding of prosocial development. For example, different
measures of prosocial behavior are often uncorrelated (e.g., Hay
and Cook, 2007; Dunﬁeld and Kuhlmeier, 2013), early prosocial-
ity often correlates with aggressive tendencies (e.g., Hay, 2006),
and children regularly ignore or exacerbate the distress of others
(Dunn, 1988).
The goal of this paper is to shed light on some of these
explanatory challenges by considering prosocial behavior from
the perspective of social-cognitive development. Speciﬁcally, I
will propose that within the general domain of prosocial behavior
there are three distinct varieties of responses that can be differenti-
ated based on their unique underlying social-cognitive constraints.
Then, I will provide evidence for the utility of this distinction by
demonstrating that these behaviors show dissociable developmen-
tal trajectories and distinct associations with individual difference
factors early in life. As this paper is intended to organize and direct
research into the emergence and early development of prosocial
behavior, the focuswill be on the rapidly growingbodyof literature
examining prosociality from infancy through early childhood.
DEFINING PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
There are many ways to act on behalf of others. Typi-
cally we apply the term “prosocial” to any behavior that is
intended to beneﬁt another (e.g., Eisenberg, 1986). Utiliz-
ing this broad deﬁnition, numerous studies have demonstrated
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that humans appear exceptional in their ability to respond
to a diversity of needs (Svetlova et al., 2010; Dunﬁeld et al.,
2011; Dunﬁeld and Kuhlmeier, 2013), very early in develop-
ment (Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992; Warneken and Tomasello, 2006).
Though we have made great strides in documenting the myriad of
prosocial behaviors that children can produce, we still have much
to learn about the mechanisms that underlie and support these
fundamental acts (see Radke-Yarrow et al., 1983 for a historical,
yet relevant, perspective on similar issues).
While many have hypothesized supporting mechanisms such
as socialization (Hastings et al., 2007), cognitive development
(e.g., perspective taking, Hoffman, 1982; Underwood and Moore,
1982), or underlying individual differences (e.g., prosocial per-
sonality, Eisenberg et al., 1999; genetic underpinnings, Knafo
and Israel, 2009), these claims have been difﬁcult to evaluate.
A historical tendency to employ a broad deﬁnition of proso-
cial behavior and naturalistic or observational designs (Schroeder
et al., 1995; Eisenberg et al., 2006) has resulted in limited con-
sistency charting the age of emergence (e.g., Zahn-Waxler et al.,
1992), developmental trajectories (e.g., Radke-Yarrow et al., 1983),
behavioral correlates (e.g., Eisen-berg and Hand, 1979), and indi-
vidual differences associated with production of other-oriented
acts. Indeed, treating all prosocial behaviors as similar “kinds” has
resulted in much difﬁculty developing coherent theories regard-
ing developmental mechanisms (see Radke-Yarrow et al., 1976;
Eisen-berg and Hand, 1979; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992 for notable
exceptions).
Part of the explanatory difﬁculty may result from a tendency
to consider prosocial development from either an individual dif-
ference or developmental universal perspective (e.g., Nichols et al.,
2009). Individual difference (dispositional) accounts attempt to
explain variability in the propensity to act prosocially by examin-
ing stable individual difference factors such as emotion regulation,
contentiousness, or inhibitory control. Though there is support for
this perspective (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1999), the pattern of rela-
tions is not always consistent. For example, though spontaneous
prosocial behavior in preschool predicts other- and self-reported
prosocial behavior in early adulthood, compliant and low-cost
helping did not. Importantly, the mechanism underlying these
variable relations is not always clear. One possibility is that that
methodological limitations associated with assessing motivation
in infancy and early childhood are limiting our ability to identify
the relevant relations (Thompson and Newton, 2013). Alterna-
tively, it’s possible that the variability reﬂects the fact that prosocial
motivation is diverse (e.g., Eisenberg et al., 1991; Paulus, 2014).
Developmental accounts, on the other hand, typically exam-
ine how the acquisition of various universal cognitive skills, such
as mental state understanding, affects the production of proso-
cial behavior. These accounts seek to explain similarities across
individuals in the development of prosocial behaviors by ﬁrst
identifying universal milestones in the development of prosocial
behavior, then identifying the underlying social cognitive corre-
lates. These two varieties of accounts are not mutually exclusive,
and there is reason to think that both dispositional and devel-
opmental factors work in concert to support the production of
prosocial behavior (e.g., Nichols et al., 2009). Speciﬁcally, it has
been suggested that prosocial behavior can be considered both
a general, superordinate category that contains a variety of dis-
tinct responses (i.e., a prosocial disposition), but also a construct
that gains breath and complexity with development (i.e., a devel-
opmental universal; Thompson and Newton, 2013). By taking a
developmental universal perspective, the current paper seeks to
clarify the variety of ways humans act prosocially with the hope
that by clarifying the various manifestations of prosocial behav-
ior and their unique constraints, we can gain better insight into
the interplay between developmental universals and individual
differences in the production of prosocial behavior.
A DEVELOPMENTAL UNIVERSAL PERSPECTIVE
One way that we may address and overcome some of the current
explanatory limitations is by clarifying the variety of ways that
humans act prosocially. The current proposal builds off of exist-
ing categorizations that acknowledge heterogeneity in the various
manifestations of prosocial behavior and recognize an impor-
tant role for social cognitive development in the production of
early prosocial acts (e.g., Hay and Cook, 2007; Warneken and
Tomasello, 2009; Brownell et al., 2013b). However, the current
proposal differs from previous categorizations in the emphasis
placed on the primary mental state evaluation that the individual
is required to make when determining whether and how to aid
another.
Regardless of what the prosocial actor does or why, the central
characteristic underlying the dissociation of the various proso-
cial responses is the primary negative state that the actor is
recognizing and responding to. For example, effectively allevi-
ating distress in a crying individual whose stomach is rumbling
would depend on whether the affective response is a cause or
consequence of the hunger. An individual who is so hungry they
become upset requires a very different intervention than an indi-
vidual who is so upset they lose their appetite. In the ﬁrst case,
reducing hunger by offering food will alleviate the emotional dis-
tress; in the second case, reducing emotional distress by offering
social support will (eventually) alleviate the hunger (by allow-
ing an anxious appetite to return). This ﬁt between the initial
eliciting event and the appropriate/effective intervention is a fun-
damental but commonly overlooked part of engaging in prosocial
behavior.
There is growing consensus that understanding prosocial
behavior will require a multidimensional approach that considers
the variety of distinctmechanisms thatmay lead todifferent proso-
cial responses (e.g., Hay and Cook, 2007; Dunﬁeld and Kuhlmeier,
2013; Thompson and Newton, 2013; Paulus, 2014). Categorizing
varieties of prosocial behavior based on the negative state they
respond to seems to be a fruitful conceptualization because con-
siderable past research has demonstrated that from very early in
development humans automatically identify others’ mental states
(including goals, beliefs, and desires) and then use these evalua-
tions to understand and predict others’behavior (e.g., Frith, 2012).
This tendency to automatically attribute and share mental states
is thought to play an integral role in human social interactions, so
much so that it has been argued that a primary function of explicit
metacognition is to enhance social relations and support fruitful
group interactions (e.g., Tomasello et al., 2005; Tomasello, 2009;
Frith, 2012).
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Consistent with this claim, previous studies have found that as
children’s social-cognitive capacities mature so does their ability
to work with (Brownell and Carriger, 1990; Brownell et al., 2006)
and on behalf of others (Wu and Su, 2014). Moreover, framing
social cognitive tasks as prosocial problems appears to facilitate
performance (Matsui and Miura, 2008; Buttelmann et al., 2009),
suggesting that prosocial behaviors are integrally entwined with
the development of human social-cognition (see also Brownell
et al., 2013b for a review). Given the automatic and pervasive
role that mental state understanding plays in a wide variety of
human interactions, and the central role prosocial behaviors play
in human social success, it is plausible that the ability to represent
others’mental states accurately is a necessary prerequisite for early
prosocial behavior.
One of the easiest, and most assured, ways of beneﬁtting
another involves intervening when they are faced with a nega-
tive experience. With this in mind, prosocial behaviors can be
thought to require three components: (1) the ability to take the
perspective of another person and recognize that they are having
a problem; (2) the ability to determine the cause of that prob-
lem; and (3) the motivation to help them overcome the problem.
Indeed, simply recognizing that someone is distressed is of lit-
tle value if one is not willing to actually do something about it,
nor is motivation helpful if you don’t know how to intervene.
Together, the ability to successfully navigate each of these steps
is necessary – but not alone sufﬁcient – for the production of
effective prosocial behavior; if an individual is unable to over-
come any of these three challenges then a successful intervention is
unlikely.
To be clear, the claim is not that all prosocial behaviors are
always motivated by the direct perception of another’s nega-
tive state. Instead, the proposal is that the earliest instances
of prosocial behaviors likely are, and that by considering the
social cognitive constraints related to recognizing a negative state
and identifying an appropriate intervention, we may gain bet-
ter insight into how prosocial behaviors develop and change over
early life. Adults are clearly motivated by imagined or implied
distress and engage in prosocial behavior even in the absence
of direct perception of a problem. At some point in develop-
ment (potentially as early as the start of the second year, e.g.,
Vaish et al., 2009; Knudsen and Liszkowski, 2013; Warneken,
2013), humans can use imagined or inferred negative states as
prosocial impetus. Without belittling the impressive develop-
mental challenges that underlie the internalization of prosocial
motivation, there is an important explanatory role for under-
standing how very young children come to recognize, interpret,
and overcome the negative states that they directly perceive in
others.
CATEGORIZING PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR
To reiterate, early prosocial behaviors rest on the ability to rec-
ognize that another is having a negative experience, the ability to
determine what an appropriate response would entail, and ﬁnally,
the motivation to intervene. With these constraints in mind, it
is helpful to consider the types of negative states that individuals
may need to recognize and respond to when engaging with others.
Broadly considered, humans appear to experience three varieties
of negatives states: instrumental need, where an individual has dif-
ﬁculty completing goal directedbehavior; unmet material desire, in
which the individual does not have access to a particular resource;
and emotional distress, when an individual experiences a nega-
tively arousing emotional state. Further, each of these negative
states can be alleviated by a different variety of prosocial behavior
namely, helping (e.g., retrieving an out of reach object; Warneken
and Tomasello, 2006), sharing (e.g., giving up a limited resource,
Hay, 1979; Brownell et al., 2009), and comforting (e.g., offering
verbal or physical support; Vaish et al., 2009; Svetlova et al., 2010),
respectively.
Because these three varieties of prosocial behavior are thought
to rely on different initial social-cognitive assessments (i.e., goals,
desires, and emotions), and the ability to represent these various
mental states show unique patterns of development (e.g., Well-
man and Woolley, 1990; Repacholi and Gopnik, 1997; Woodward,
1998;Wellman and Liu, 2004;Wellman et al., 2011), we should not
necessarily predict consistency in the age of emergence, develop-
mental trajectories, or supporting mechanisms for each variety of
prosocial behavior. Looking to the existing literature on children’s
social cognitive development, we ﬁnd support for this position.
INSTRUMENTAL NEED
Representing the problem
Helping requires the ability to accurately represent an instru-
mental need. Representing an instrumental need requires the
ability to attribute an intended goal despite incomplete obser-
vations. Previous research suggests that within the ﬁrst year of
life infants can represent simple goal directed action (Wood-
ward, 1998; Csibra et al., 1999), and shortly thereafter they
can differentiate intentional from unintentional acts and recre-
ate intended acts despite incomplete observations (Carpenter
et al., 1998; Behne et al., 2005). For example, between 5 and
9 months, infants begin to construe others’ actions in terms of
goals, not motions, showing greater interest in actors that change
the target, as opposed to direction, of their reach (Woodward,
1998). By 8 months, infants identify and preferentially imitate
intended behaviors, even when they are paired with accidental
behaviors (Carpenter et al., 1998). Finally, by 9 months, infants
prefer, and show more patience towards, individuals who fail to
share because they are unable (and kept dropping the toy out
of reach) as opposed to unwilling (and kept pulling the toy out
of reach; Behne et al., 2005). Together, these studies demon-
strate that between the end of the ﬁrst year and start of the
second year, infants are able to represent other’s behaviors in
terms of their underlying goal structure and, despite observ-
ing incomplete actions, differentiate intended from unintended
outcomes.
Representing the solution
In addition to being able to represent the goal structure underly-
ing and organizing behavior, effective helping requires the ability
to recognize effective interventions that support goal completion.
An understanding of goals, and a preference for individuals associ-
ated with goal completion, appears to develop within the ﬁrst year
of life. For example, 8-month-olds expect individuals to display
positive emotions following goal completion (Skerry and Spelke,
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2014). By 2 years, infants display sympathetic nervous system
arousal in response to incomplete goals, which is reduced after
they witness the individual receive help, regardless of whether the
help is self or other initiated (Hepach et al., 2012). Finally, when
infants witness a character trying but failing to complete a goal,
they prefer the character that was helpful (Hamlin et al., 2007)
and expect others to share this preference (Kuhlmeier et al., 2003).
And although these studies were not speciﬁcally intended to assess
infants’ understanding of effective goal interventions, the only way
infants could have made sense of the various interactions is by
representing an initial goal (e.g., getting up the hill), representing
the appropriate intervention (e.g., pushing to the top), and under-
standing that individuals are positively inclined towards completed
goals.
Finally, utilizing a behavioral reenactment paradigm, Meltzoff
(1995) provides the clearest evidence that by 18 months infants
not only represent other’s actions as goal directed and prefer indi-
viduals and situations associated with completed goals, but also
that they can represent and reproduce goals that they have not
witnessed completed. Children watched as an experimenter tried
but failed to complete a number of actions such as pulling apart
a dumb bell or hanging a hoop on a post. The children were
then given the opportunity to produce the actions themselves.
Consistent with an ability to represent human action through
the organizing lens of goals, the infants preferentially produced
the actor’s intended outcome (e.g., pulled the barbells apart and
hung the hoop) despite the fact they had never seen these goals
completed, simply implied.
Together, it is clear from the extant literature that before the
second birthday, children represent others’ actions in terms of
underlying goals, recognize when and why goals may fail to be
completed, and are highly motivated to see goals achieved. This
suggests that within the ﬁrst two years of life, children have devel-
oped the social cognitive skills required to support the recognition
of instrumental need and produce helping behaviors.
UNMET MATERIAL DESIRE
Representing the problem
Sharing, on the other hand, requires the ability and willing-
ness to represent another’s unmet material desire. Typically,
this involves recognizing and rectifying an unequal distribu-
tion of resources. In adults, allotments tend to be governed
by the norm of fair distribution and associated with the “prin-
ciple of equality,” which proposes that ceteris paribus goods
should be divided equally among potential recipients, particu-
larly when the primary goal of the interaction involves fostering
and maintaining “enjoyable social relations” (Deutsch, 1975, p.
143). This tendency is well established in adults (e.g., Henrich
et al., 2005; Baumard et al., 2013) and appears to emerge rela-
tively early in development (e.g., Fehr et al., 2008; Sloane et al.,
2012). Yet, unlike goal understanding, which has been exten-
sively studied outside of the domain of prosocial behavior, the
majority of the work that speaks to children’s understanding
of resource inequality has been examined in relation to sharing
behaviors.
Despite a long history of debate regarding whether children
under the age of 5 are sensitive to unequal distributions of
resources (e.g., Lane and Coon, 1972; Damon, 1975; Fehr et al.,
2008), recent research utilizing a variety of converging implicit
measures suggests that infants begin to recognize unequal distri-
butions, and prefer equal distributions, early in their second year
of life. Speciﬁcally, infants show greater attention to unfair (i.e.,
unequal) as opposed to fair (i.e., equal) distributions, suggest-
ing that they expect resources to be divided fairly (e.g., Sloane
et al., 2012). Indeed, multiple studies, conducted across a variety
of labs, conﬁrm this tendency (Geraci and Surian, 2011; Schmidt
and Sommerville, 2011; Sommerville et al., 2013).
Critically, this preference for equal outcomes appears speciﬁc to
social interactions. Infants donot showa similar pattern of looking
when the recipient is inanimate, ruling out a low-level percep-
tual preference for equal amounts (Sloane et al., 2012). Moreover,
consistent with the recognition that, in general, it is preferable
to share items equally between recipients, infants prefer (based
on reaching behavior) and expect others to prefer (based on look-
ing time preferences) equal distributors (Geraci and Surian, 2011).
Finally, consistentwith the claim that representing anunmetmate-
rial desire is uniquely important to the development of sharing
behavior, infants’ sensitivity to unfair outcomes correlates with
concurrent sharing (Schmidt and Sommerville, 2011) but not
helping (Sommerville et al., 2013).
Although children under the age of 5 show mixed results
articulating norms and expectations of fairness, when response
demands are reduced and implicit measures (such as affective
behavior) are used, children as young as 3 years of age recognize
and respond negatively to unfair distributions of resources (LoBue
et al., 2011). Speciﬁcally, children display clear negative emotions
in response to unequal distributions and when prompted, iden-
tify such outcomes as “unfair” (especially when the participant
is in the disadvantaged position). Together, this research sug-
gests that the ability to represent, and negatively evaluate, unequal
access to resources emerges over the course of the second year of
development.
Representing the solution
Effectively alleviating material desire requires the ability to rec-
ognize an unequal distribution of resources, the motivation to
see equality restored, and the ability to overcome an egocentric
desire to monopolize resources. Although children can recognize
unequal distributions of resources at least by 15 months, it is not
clear that recognizing inequality is, in and of itself, sufﬁcient to
account for sharing behavior. Indeed, a compelling point raised by
comparative researchers is that evenwhen chimpanzees (and other
non-human primates) can recognize an unfair offer, they are not
necessarily motivated to act in order the change the situation (e.g.,
Brosnan,2013). Moreover, evenwhen children do act to change sit-
uations, it is not always clear whether their behaviors are directed
at the alleviation of material desire per se, or are a manifestation
of an impulse to engage socially (Tomasello et al., 2005).
When children are given the opportunity to divide resources
between themselves and others, or select between predetermined
divisions, there is a general trend towards fairer behavior with age.
For example, when children are given the opportunity to divide
resources on behalf of another, children as young as 3 work to
ensure equal distributions (Olson and Spelke, 2008; Shaw and
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Olson, 2012). However, when children are making decisions that
affect the self, an aversion to disadvantageous equality (i.e., reject-
ing offers that favor the other, e.g., 1 – self, 4 – other) emerges
around 4 years of age, while opposition to advantageous inequal-
ity (i.e., rejecting offers that favor the self, e.g., 4 – self, 1 – other)
emerges much later, between the ages of 6 and 8 years (Blake and
McAuliffe, 2011).
Interestingly, despite having the ability to articulate the norm
of fairness as young as 3, children do not always follow it. For
example, Smith et al. (2013) found that children could report that
they should distribute resources fairly and expected others to do
so, yet when given the chance to divide resources, they showed
a preference for self. Most amusingly, children seem well aware
of their limits; though they knew they should share fairly, and
expected others to do so, when asked what they would do when
given the opportunity to share, participants correctly predicted
that they would behave selﬁshly.
Finally, a recent study that employed both experimental con-
trol and a naturalistic social context demonstrated an increase in
the frequency and spontaneity of early sharing behavior between
18 and 24 months (Brownell et al., 2013a). Speciﬁcally, partici-
pants were given access to food and toys in the presence of an
adult experimenter who had none. Unlike many of the stud-
ies examining resource distribution, the participants were not
explicitly instructed to divide the resources. Instead, the adult
playmate expressed her desire using a series of progressively more
explicit cues. Eighteen-month-olds were willing to share but often
only after the experimenter made her desire explicit. In con-
trast, by 24 months, participants shared spontaneously, often
immediately, and typically more generously than at 18 months.
Moreover, consistent with an important role for understanding
another’s desire in the emergence of sharing behavior, sharing was
positively associated with understanding of self and ownership,
and negatively associated with self-focused behaviors (e.g., ignor-
ing the experimenter) and hypothesis testing (e.g., staring at the
experimenter).
In sum, children recognize the importance of equal outcomes
within the ﬁrst two years of life; however, the tendency to sponta-
neously act to resolve these issues shows protracted development.
Moreover, there are a number of situational factors that inﬂuence
whether children will apply their recognition of unequal outcomes
to remedy an unfair situation. For example, sharing in children
under the age of 3 can be increased when others make their desire
explicit (e.g., Brownell et al., 2009, 2013a; Dunﬁeld et al., 2011),
the cost of sharing is low (e.g., Thompson et al., 1997; Moore,
2009), or the recipient is familiar (Rheingold et al., 1976; Hay,
1979; Hay and Murray, 1982). Together these ﬁndings providing
further support for the proposal that recognizing unmet material
desire (i.e., an unequal outcome) alone is not sufﬁcient for effective
sharing, particularly when the solution is unclear, or motivation is
weak.
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Representing the problem
Comforting requires the ability to represent another’s negative
emotional state. Effectively representing another’s emotional dis-
tress requires the ability to differentiate and identify the various
emotional experiences of others. From the earliest days of life,
infants respond to other’s distress with distress of their own (e.g.,
Sagi and Hoffman, 1976). Yet, despite the integral role that emo-
tional contagion is thought to play in the development of sympathy
and comforting behavior (see Hoffman, 1982; Preston and De
Waal, 2002; Decety and Meyer, 2008 for reviews), it is not suf-
ﬁcient to support effective other-oriented responses to distress.
Instead, it is the ability to identify both another’s negative emo-
tional state, and the cause, that likely supports effective comforting
behavior.
Researchers have demonstrated the foundations of the ability
to identify negative emotional states in early infancy. As early as
3 months of age, infants can differentiate the facial expressions
of happiness from surprise and anger, and by 7 months, infants
can additionally represent fear, sadness, and interest (Grossmann,
2010). Developing in concert with the ability to discriminate
between various emotional expressions is the ability to represent
the equivalency of various emotional cues. For example, around
7 months of age, infants begin to recognize conﬂicting emotional
expressions (e.g., when a sad face is paired with a happy voice)
and preferentially attend to pairings that are emotionally consis-
tent (e.g., a happy face paired with a happy voice; Walker-Andrews
and Dickson, 1997). Together, these results suggest that within the
ﬁrst year of life infants differentiate positive andnegative emotions,
with differentiation between varieties of negative affect developing
shortly thereafter.
Consistent with many developmental accomplishments, chil-
dren’s emotion recognition appears to vary depending on the
task demands. Although infants can differentiate varieties of
emotional expressions and recognize cross-modal congruence in
implicit tasks within the ﬁrst year of life, it is not until almost
3 years of age that they show a limited ability to discuss a
restricted range of emotions (Denham and Couchoud, 1990).
The development of children’s ability to explicitly label others’
emotions mirrors the developmental progression observed with
implicit measures. Speciﬁcally, while children as young as 2 years
can label happiness, it takes an additional year or two before
they can reliably identify negative emotions such as anger, fear,
and sadness (Denham and Couchoud, 1990; Widen and Rus-
sell, 2003). As a whole, these studies suggest that while some of
the necessary emotional understanding is in place in the ﬁrst
year of life (i.e., emotional discrimination and expectations of
consistency), many of the requisite skills (i.e., explicitly identi-
fying the particular type of distress) do not emerge until later
toddlerhood.
Representing the solution
Simply recognizing another’s negative emotions is not sufﬁcient
to support mature comforting behavior. Being able to identify
the cause of another’s emotional state is critically important for
understanding and intervening on their behalf (e.g., Saarni et al.,
2006). Indeed, the social, emotional, and cognitive develop-
ments that children experience over the ﬁrst year of life – which
allow them to progress from mirroring another’s negative emo-
tion to representing the negative state and understanding a cause
and solution – have long been thought to be an integral part of
prosocial development (Hoffman, 1982, 2000).
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Children’s understanding of the idiosyncratic nature of emo-
tions emerges in the second year of life. For example, though
14-month-olds overgeneralize their personal preferences, 18-
month-olds recognized that individuals might differ in their
emotional experiences (Repacholi and Gopnik, 1997). Relat-
edly, children as young as 2, understand that situational fac-
tors inﬂuence both emotions and behaviors (Wellman and
Woolley, 1990). Then, by three children can make accu-
rate predictions regarding the types of situations that lead to
happiness and between 4 and 5 start making accurate pre-
dictions about situations that lead to anger, fear, or sur-
prise (Denham and Couchoud, 1990; Widen and Russell,
2003).
Finally, children not only recognize situations that lead to
various emotions, but also the contextual appropriateness of
emotional expressions. As early as 18 months infants have expec-
tations regarding likely emotional reactions, engaging in more
checking behavior and less concerned attention when witnessing
unjustiﬁed as opposed to justiﬁed distress (i.e., distress fol-
lowing positive versus negative outcomes respectively; Chiarella
and Poulin-DuBois, 2013). Further, by 3 years of age, chil-
dren will show concern, offer assistance, and even check on an
individual who has displayed justiﬁable distress, while largely
ignoring an individual whose distress is unjustiﬁed (Hepach
et al., 2013). It appears as though the appropriateness of the
emotion plays an important role in early distress interven-
tion.
Thus, although infants can recognize consistency in emotional
expressions within the ﬁrst year of life, the ability to repre-
sent, track, and respond appropriately to the person-speciﬁc
idiosyncratic nature of emotions takes much longer to develop.
Indeed, consistent with Hoffman’s early theoretical account, the
ability to represent another’s emotional distress alone is not sufﬁ-
cient for effective comforting interactions. Instead, it is likely that
effective other-oriented comforting should emerge over the course
of the second to fourth years and capitalize on a growing under-
standing of the unique, diverse, and situationally constrained
nature of others’ emotional experiences.
PROSOCIAL BEHAVIOR AS HELPING, SHARING, AND
COMFORTING SUBTYPES
To summarize, this categorization (Figure 1) proposes that within
the general domain of prosocial behavior there are three more
speciﬁc varieties of behavior that individuals engage in, namely
helping, sharing, and comforting. Moreover, each of these three
varieties of behavior is elicited by a unique negative state: instru-
mental need, material desire, and emotional distress, respectively.
Because the successful production of an effective prosocial inter-
vention relies largely on the ability to recognize the presence of
a negative state and determine the cause of the negative state,
FIGURE 1 | Categorization of prosocial behavior based on the varieties of negative state the child must identify and overcome. An effective
intervention will only occur when all three components can be successfully resolved. Different varieties of prosocial behavior show independent developmental
trajectories because of the unique social cognitive demands.
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this categorization allows us to make a number of predictions:
(1) Prosocial behavior should be more likely to occur when a
negative state is present than when it is absent. (2) Different
varieties of prosocial behavior should emerge at different ages
and develop along different trajectories based on the underlying
social-cognitive constraints. (3) Finally, individual difference fac-
tors should affect the various formof prosocial behavior differently
depending on how they inﬂuence the underlying constraints. In
the following sections, I will brieﬂy present a selection of relevant
research that speak to these predictions and support the utility of
this categorization.
RESPONDING TO NEGATIVE STATES
One of the major contributions of this categorization is that it
predicts that other-oriented acts, especially ones produced early
in life, are more likely to occur when the child is able to represent
another’s negative state. Recent research provides strong support
for this proposal. Warneken and Tomasello (2006) developed a
novel experimental paradigm that clearly demonstrates that by
18 months, children will intervene helpfully when they observe an
unknown adult in need of help. Unlike much previous research,
this study included an elegant control condition that allowed for
a systematic investigation of the role of need in the production
of prosocial behavior. In experimental trials, the children saw
the experimenter genuinely trying and failing to complete a goal,
whereas in control trials the children observed the same behaviors
manipulated to obscure the experimenter’s need. Across a variety
of tasks, 18-month-olds showed a sensitivity to need, helping only
in situations where the experimenter was actually having difﬁculty
completing an intended goal.
Capitalizing on this powerful experimental design, more recent
studies have examined infants’ ability to respond to all three of
the proposed negative states (Dunﬁeld et al., 2011). Speciﬁcally,
infants were presented with both an experimental and control trial
for instrumental need, unmet material desire, and emotional dis-
tress. In experimental trials the negative state was clearly present.
In control trials however, the participants observed identical sur-
face behavior with the negative state obscured. Consistent with
the proposal that prosocial behavior relies on the ability to repre-
sent the negative states of another, both 18- and 24-month-olds
were found to help and share when instrumental need and mate-
rial desire were present (experimental trials), but not in highly
similar situations where the negative states were absent (control
condition). Even in the case of emotional distress, in which chil-
dren failed to differentiate between the experimental and control
conditions, it was not because they inappropriately offered com-
fort in the absence of a distress cue; instead, they simply failed to
demonstrate any prosocial behavior.
Consistent with an important role for representing negative
states in the production of prosocial behavior, young children are
more likely to act prosocially when the appropriate intervention
is made obvious, or the speciﬁc negative state and appropriate
intervention is made explicit (e.g., Brownell et al., 2009, 2013a;
Svetlova et al., 2010; Dunﬁeld and Kuhlmeier, 2013). For example,
Svetlova et al. (2010) gave 18- and 30-month-olds the opportunity
to respond to multiple prosocial “requests” in which the children
could alleviate the experimenter’s distress by offering her various
objects; over the course of each trial the experimenter exhibited up
to eight increasingly speciﬁc cues that eventually highlighted the
particular need and the appropriate intervention. Two patterns of
results were particularly compelling: (1) 30-month-olds required
less explicit cuing than 18-month-olds, and (2) childrenweremore
likely to assist when the experimenter’s difﬁculty was instrumental
as opposed to emotional. Together these results support the pro-
posal that early in development the ability to represent another’s
negative state limits when and how children produce prosocial
behavior.
Moreover, consistent with an important role for negative state
understanding in the production of effective prosocial behavior,
3-year-olds will override an experimenter’s speciﬁc request (e.g.,
for a cup that the child knows is broken) in order to provide more
effective solutions (e.g., for another cup that was not requested
but functional; Martin and Olson, 2013). Taken together, there
is mounting support for the proposal that differences in the age
and conditions under which children’s early prosocial behaviors
develop may be accounted for, at least in part, by the develop-
ing ability to represent accurately the negative mental states of
others.
Finally, though early prosocial behaviors are often observed
in response to negative states, it is not the case that all prosocial
behaviors are always motivated by the direct perception of difﬁ-
culty. For example, while 14- and 18-month olds are more likely
to help an experimenter who notices, and reaches for a dropped
object (Warneken and Tomasello, 2006, 2007), by 30-months chil-
dren helpfully retrieve dropped objects that were unnoticed by the
experimenter (Warneken, 2013), suggesting that children quickly
internalize situations that lead to instrumental need.
Moreover, as predicted by the categorization, some negative
states are unrelated to the production of a prosocial interven-
tion. Speciﬁcally, consistent with the claim that helping is a
speciﬁc response to an instrumental need, the addition of neg-
ative affect does not increase helping behavior (Newton et al.,
2014). Yet, the ability to take another’s affective perspective,
even in the absence of displayed negative affect, inﬂuences
children’s motivation to share following the observation of a
clearly unmet material desire (Vaish et al., 2009). Further, in
cases where a goal has been demonstrated and an impedi-
ment to goal completion is made clear, children as young as
18 months can communicate helpfully to aid an experimenter
in avoiding a negative outcome (i.e., before the problem occurs,
Knudsen and Liszkowski, 2013).
Together, these studies support the important ﬁt between the
representation of a particular negative state and the ability to pro-
duce an appropriate prosocial intervention. Yet they also highlight
an important role for future research in better understandingwhen
and how these evaluations get internalized. Moreover, they suggest
more research is required to understand how individuals come to
triage between negative states to determine the core issue that
needs to be addressed in order to appropriately and effectively aid
another.
AGE OF EMERGENCE AND DEVELOPMENTAL TRAJECTORIES
Another prediction of this categorization is that varieties of proso-
cial behavior should emerge at different ages and develop along
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distinct developmental trajectories due to the fact they rely on
different mental state attributions, which develop along different
trajectories. Though previous research has suggested that proso-
cial behavior emerges between the ﬁrst and second birthday and
increases in frequency and complexity as the child ages (e.g., Hoff-
man, 1982; Zahn-Waxler et al., 1992; Hay, 1994; Eisenberg et al.,
2006), it is not clear that this claim applies equally to all varieties
of prosocial responses.
Looking to the existing literature reviewed above, children
should be able to respond to instrumental need prior to unmet
material desire and emotional distress, both of which will show
more variability and context dependence due to the later emerg-
ing social cognitive supports. Consistent with this prediction,
helping appears to be one of the earliest emerging forms of proso-
cial behavior, beginning shortly after the child’s ﬁrst birthday
(Warneken and Tomasello, 2007) and showing rapid development
over the ﬁrst half of the second year (Warneken and Tomasello,
2006). Sharing appears to emerge later in the second year increas-
ing in frequency and spontaneity between 18 and 24 months
(Brownell et al., 2013a), supported by a clear articulation of
desire (Brownell et al., 2009, 2013a), and a reduction of inhibitory
demands (e.g., Olson and Spelke, 2008; Smith et al., 2013). Finally,
as expected, children’s ability to alleviate another’s emotional
distress with other-oriented comforting behavior emerges last
(Dunﬁeld and Kuhlmeier, 2013) and is preceded by concerned
attention (Spinrad and Stifter, 2006), and facilitated by clarifying
the appropriate intervention (Svetlova et al., 2010).
We see the same pattern of production when the three neg-
ative states are presented within-subject, suggesting this is not a
methodological artifact but instead a characteristic of early other-
oriented behaviors (Dunﬁeld et al., 2011; Dunﬁeld and Kuhlmeier,
2013). Further, tasks that use subsets of prosocial behavior con-
verge, showing that relative to helping, comforting emerges later
(Radke-Yarrow et al., 1976) and sharing appear less frequent
(Radke-Yarrow et al., 1976; Grusec, 1991; Eisenberg, 2005).
Together, the existing literature supports the claim that early
prosocial behaviors show unique patterns of emergence as a func-
tion of the speciﬁc negative state they address. Further, these
studies are consistent with the position that the ability to under-
stand others’ negative mental states inﬂuences the age at which
children can intervene prosocially on behalf of others. Indeed,
children are more likely to assist others when the negative state is
made clear and the appropriate intervention is simple, suggesting
an important facilitatory role for mental-state understanding in
the development of children’s prosocial responses.
A closely related prediction is that the production of var-
ious forms of other-oriented behavior should not necessarily
correlate. Dunﬁeld and Kuhlmeier (2013) gave 2-, 3-, and
4-year-olds the opportunity to respond to four instances of
instrumental need, unmet material desire, and emotional dis-
tress. Because the children were given the opportunity to respond
to multiple instances of multiple varieties of each of the three
negative states, it was possible to examine correlations both
within and across tasks. Consistent with the proposed utility
of the present categorization, participants reliably responded
to a particular negative state, while responses across negative
states remained uncorrelated. Thompson and Newton (2013),
ﬁnd consistent behavioral results and similarly suggest that dif-
ferences in the production of varieties of prosocial behavior
may relate to the unique underlying social-cognitive constraints.
Finally, in support of these interpretations, it appears that
helping and comforting are associated with distinct, dissocia-
ble neural correlates (sharing was not examined; Paulus et al.,
2013).
Taken together, there is mounting support for the proposal
that helping, sharing, and comforting reﬂect unique varieties of
prosocial behaviors with distinct ages of onset (Dunﬁeld et al.,
2011), unique uncorrelated developmental trajectories (Dunﬁeld
and Kuhlmeier, 2013; however, see Thompson and Newton, 2013
for an alternative explanation), and distinct underlying neuro-
physiological supports (Paulus et al., 2013). Each of these ﬁndings
are consistent with the utility in dividing the general domain of
prosocial behavior into three more speciﬁc varieties based on the
unique mental state they respond to.
VARIABILITY IN DEVELOPMENT
The third prediction is that individual differences will not nec-
essarily inﬂuence each variety of prosocial behavior equally. A
number of individual difference factors have been found to affect
the production of prosocial behavior as a whole (for compre-
hensive reviews see Eisenberg et al., 2006, in press). However,
because these studies were not intended to examine whether dif-
ferent prosocial behavior are differentially affected by individual
difference factors, it is not possible to determine whether these fac-
tors have a similar inﬂuence on all proposed varieties of prosocial
behaviors or instead exert their inﬂuences selectively. If the pro-
posed categorization based on negative state attribution is going
to be useful in organizing the examination of prosocial behav-
ior, then it should help predict and explain differences in the
production of prosocial behavior across individuals. Speciﬁcally,
an individual difference factor should only affect the produc-
tion of a particular prosocial behavior if it inﬂuences the ability
to represent, or the motivation to resolve, a particular negative
state. In this section I will demonstrate how variations in social
cognition, emotion processing, socialization, and culture assert
different inﬂuences on the three proposed varieties of prosocial
behavior.
Autism
One factor that thatmay affect the ability to represent, andmotiva-
tion to assist in overcoming, another’s negative state is a diagnosis
of autism spectrum disorder (ASD). Children with ASD develop
social cognitive abilities along an atypical trajectory (e.g., Char-
man et al., 1998; Dyck et al., 2001) and receive less reinforcement
from shared social interactions (Dawson et al., 2004). This sug-
gest that children with autism may have a harder time recognizing
and interpreting each of the three negative states and possess less
motivation to see another’s negative state overcome.
The few studies that do exist examining prosocial behaviors in
childrenwith autism found thatwhile childrenwithASD engage in
simple helping and sharing (Liebal et al., 2008), they are unlikely
to respond to observations of distress (e.g., Sigman et al., 1992;
Travis et al., 2001; Hobson et al., 2009). When given the oppor-
tunity to respond to all three varieties of prosocial behavior in a
Frontiers in Psychology | Developmental Psychology September 2014 | Volume 5 | Article 958 | 8
Dunﬁeld Varieties of prosocial behavior
controlled experimental paradigm (see Section“Methods”inDun-
ﬁeld et al., 2011), children with ASD responded to material desire
and emotional distress, but surprisingly, not instrumental need
(Dunﬁeld et al., 2012). Although these children were much older
(the mean age was 46 months) than Dunﬁeld et al.’s (2011) sam-
ple, the overall pattern of results was opposite, with comforting
and sharing preceding helping, suggesting that the unique suite
of social-cognitive abilities and deﬁcits that characterize ASD do
indeed differentially affect the three varieties of prosocial behavior.
However, it is not currently possible to determine if these effects are
a function of difﬁculty representing the displayed negative state,
or limited motivation to interact, future research will be required
to determine at which stage in the prosocial process children with
autism are experiencing difﬁculty.
Attachment security
A second individual difference factor that has been observed
to differentially affect the ability to represent the various nega-
tives states is attachment security. Attachment security refers to
the extent to which individuals believe that they can depend on
others to have their needs met, and their expectations regard-
ing others’ tendencies to seek and accept comfort (e.g., Bowlby,
1982). Securely attached individuals generally see other peo-
ple as reliable sources of support, whereas insecurely attached
individuals see others as unreliable sources of potential pain
(e.g., Dykas and Cassidy, 2011). And although attachment
security has been generally associated with the production of
empathic behaviors across the lifespan (Mikulincer et al., 2001;
Mikulincer and Shaver, 2005; Mikulincer et al., 2005; Diamond
et al., 2012), it is possible that it does not affect the abil-
ity to represent all three varieties of negative states equally
(Johnson et al., 2013).
Speciﬁcally, though infants appear to have universal expecta-
tions regarding instrumental interventions (e.g., Kuhlmeier et al.,
2003; Hamlin et al., 2007), their expectations regarding emotion-
ally distressing situations appears to differ based on attachment
security (e.g., Johnson et al., 2007, 2010). When university under-
graduates are given the opportunity to describe social interactions
where the speciﬁc negative state is ambiguous, securely attached
individuals identify both instrumental need and social-emotional
distress with equal ease, while insecurely attached individuals
preferentially avoid discussing social-emotional distress (Dun-
ﬁeld, 2012; Johnson et al., 2013). Attachment security appears to
represent a second domain of individual difference that exerts a
differential effect on the ability to represent the various negative
states. Future research will need to examine whether and how
these different representations affect the production of the three
varieties of prosocial behavior.
Socialization
While the focus of this paper has largely been the importance
of considering underlying, species universal, social cognitive
mechanisms that differentiate varieties of prosocial behaviors,
socialization plays an integral role in the emergence and produc-
tionof prosocial behavior (e.g., Rheingold,1982;Hay,1994). Styles
of caregiving, play, and discipline have all been found to inﬂuence
children’s tendency to respond sensitively and appropriately to the
observation of another’s distress (for a complete review of the
socialization of prosocial behavior, see Hastings et al., 2007; Eisen-
berg et al., in press). Particularly relevant to the current proposal is
the idea that there are at least three pathways throughwhich social-
ization can inﬂuence the production of prosocial behavior (e.g.,
Brownell et al., 2013c). Speciﬁcally, socialization could affect the
production of prosocial behavior by increasing motivation (e.g.,
Dunn, 2008), supporting self-regulatory skills (e.g., Eisenberg,
2000; Spinrad and Stifter, 2006), or supporting the development
of underlying social cognitive abilities (e.g., Denham et al., 1994;
Ensor et al., 2011).
While it is clear that socialization is fundamentally impor-
tant to supporting the production of prosocial behavior, it is not
clear that all types of socialization are equally effective in encour-
aging all varieties of prosocial behavior. For example, a recent
study (Pettygrove et al., 2013) investigated the relation between
parental socialization and prosocial behavior by giving 18- and
30-month olds the opportunity to help, share, and comfort in
response to increasingly explicit cues to the experimenter’s neg-
ative state. Additionally, parental socialization techniques were
coded while the parent and child interacted in a different but
related task. The researchers replicated previous ﬁndings regard-
ing the unique, uncorrelated production of prosocial behavior
in early development. Moreover, they demonstrate that varieties
of prosocial behaviors were differentially affected by varieties of
socialization techniques, ﬁnding that the most effective social-
ization techniques were ones that targeted the child’s particular
developmental need.
However, socialization inﬂuences do not always show distinct
relations with varieties of prosocial behaviors. For example, par-
ents who frequently elicited emotion talk from their children
tended to have children who helped and shared more quickly and
frequently than children who engaged in less emotion discussion
(Brownell et al., 2013c). Looking to the three components that are
proposed to support effective prosocial behavior, it is possible that
factors that inﬂuence the ability to represent the underlying nega-
tive state and solution may require different socializing inﬂuences
(e.g., Pettygrove et al., 2013) than factors affecting motivation
to act on behalf of others (e.g., Brownell et al., 2013c). Speciﬁ-
cally, though socialization undoubtedly plays an important role in
supportingwhen and how children act on behalf of others, consid-
ering the unique constraints that underlie the varieties of prosocial
behavior may lead to more nuanced understanding of the variety
of ways that socialization exerts its inﬂuence. This categorization
of prosocial behavior, based on the unique and dissociable social-
cognitive constraints that underlie other-oriented acts, could aid
in better understanding when, how, and why, varieties of prosocial
are differentially inﬂuenced by socialization.
Culture
Although it is well established that humans universally engage
in prosocial behaviors (e.g., Henrich et al., 2005), there appears
to be culture-speciﬁc variability in the developmental trajecto-
ries (Rochat et al., 2009; Callaghan et al., 2011), frequency (Graves
and Graves, 1983; Williams, 1991), and social cognitive inﬂuences
(Kärtner et al., 2010) underlying varieties of prosocial behavior
(for more comprehensive reviews see Drummond et al., in press;
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Hammond et al., in press). Speciﬁcally, cultures seem to vary in
the types of prosocial behaviors they value, beliefs about who is
deserving of prosocial behavior, and the manner in which social-
cognitive abilities support the production of prosocial behavior
(e.g., de Guzman et al., 2008; Knafo et al., 2009).
There is relatively little systematic cross-cultural research
examining the production of multiple varieties of prosocial
behavior, particularly in early childhood, but the studies that
do exist suggest that some components of prosocial develop-
ment are shared across cultures, while others vary. For exam-
ple, though mothers from Peru, India, and China all report
that their infants begin helping between 14 and 17 months,
they identiﬁed different types of helping behavior (Callaghan
et al., 2011). Speciﬁcally, Peruvian and Indian children tended
to only help with household tasks, while Canadian children
also engaged in self-helping behaviors such as dressing and
putting away toys. Mothers also reported different motivations
underlying helping; Peruvian mothers saw helping as a natu-
ral behavior, Indian mothers saw it as reﬂection of their child’s
understanding of need, whereas Canadian mothers saw it as a
function of social learning. Yet, despite these differential self-
reports, by 18 months children from all three cultures identiﬁed
instrumental need and preferentially helped when need was
present.
When sharing behavior is examined across a number of diverse
cultural contexts (i.e., rich and poor urban environments, small-
scale traditional and rural communities; Rochat et al., 2009), the
general trend of 3-year-olds engaging in relatively self-interested
behavior that becomes increasingly other-oriented by 5 is repli-
cated. Moreover, the results hinted at a universal association
between the development of social cognition and increasingly gen-
erous behavior. However, despite considerable similarity, there are
important differences in the level of self-interest the youngest chil-
dren started with and magnitude of the developmental differences
across the various cultures tested.
Finally, when given an opportunity to respond to an experi-
menter’s emotional distress, 19-month-olds in Berlin and Delhi
were equally likely to recognize and respond to an experi-
menter’s negative emotional state (Kärtner et al.,2010).Yet, despite
responding similarly to distress cues, the two cultures differed
in the socialization goals they emphasized and the role of social
cognitive development in the production of pseudo-comforting
behavior. Speciﬁcally, mothers from Delhi tended to empha-
size more relational socialization goals than mothers from Berlin
whereas, mirror self-recognition predicted distress and comfort-
ing behavior in Berlin but not Delhi. Together these results suggest
that there may be a number of distinct developmental routes that
lead to similar behavioral outcomes.
Though the tendency to produce prosocial behaviors is a
human universal, there is considerable cultural variability in the
form and development of other-oriented acts. Culture may exert
its inﬂuence on the development of prosocial behavior by selec-
tively emphasizing particular values and then affording differential
socialization opportunities (e.g., Keller, 2007). Moreover, depend-
ing on the cultural context of development, it is possible that the
same developmental outcome (i.e., effective other-oriented behav-
ior) may emerge along different pathways. To that end, research
that speciﬁcally examines varieties of prosocial behavior and their
associated social-cognitive supports will be in a better position to
understand the nuanced development of these fundamental social
behaviors.
Taken together, the reviewed lines of research suggest that indi-
vidual difference factors donot necessarily exert the same inﬂuence
on all varieties of prosocial behavior. Speciﬁcally, it is important to
consider the ﬁt between the social-cognitive ormotivational effects
of a particular individual difference variable and the demands of a
particular variety of prosocial behavior when predicting how the
two will interact. While exciting and suggestive, this line of inquiry
is still in its infancy. An important direction for future researchwill
involve a more systematic examination of how various individual
differences affect the representations and motivations underlying
the three varieties of negative states and the extent to which these
differences affect the types and frequencies of prosocial behaviors
that children produce.
SUMMARY
The goal of this paper was to address some of the inconsistencies
in our understanding of the early emergence and development
of prosocial behavior by considering the social-cognitive con-
straints that underlie the ability to act on behalf of others. This
social-cognitive categorization of prosocial behavior proposes
that within the general domain of prosocial behavior, other-
oriented actions can be categorized into three distinct types
namely: helping, sharing, and comforting. Each of these varieties
of prosocial behavior relies on the recognition of, and response
to, a distinct negative state namely: instrumental need, unmet
material desire, and emotional distress, respectively. By distin-
guishing between these three negative states we are in a better
position to identify the distinct social cognitive abilities that sup-
port each type of prosocial behavior. Importantly, by doing so
we can begin to better understand the unique ages of onset,
uncorrelated patterns of production, and distinct patterns of
individual differences that are currently challenging our under-
standing of the earliest instances of these fundamental human
behaviors.
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